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Abstract
This article explores the legal constraints imposed on the ris-
ing number of so-called ‘dangerous’ sex offenders in Eng-
land and Wales, in particular once they have been released
from prison into the community. The main methods of con-
straint are strict licence conditions, Multi-Agency Public Pro-
tection Arrangements and civil protective orders such as
Sexual Harm Prevention Orders. ‘Control’ in the community
is thus widespread, but is difficult to assess whether it is
either effective or necessary without a great deal more
research and analysis. Post-sentence ‘punishment’ has been
largely ignored by both academic lawyers and criminolo-
gists. The article concludes that financial austerity might
prove to be as important as the human rights agenda in
curbing the disproportionate use of powers of control.
Keywords: Dangerous, sex offenders, human rights, com-
munity supervision, punishment
1 Introduction
1.1 Changing Attitudes to Sex Offenders
In England and Wales, as in much of Europe, attitudes
to sex offenders appear to have hardened in recent
years. Whether this is the result of a culture of fear or
‘moral panics’ in an age of anxiety and insecurity is for
others to judge.1 But ‘sex scandals’ appear to have filled
the press in recent times. Some scandals have involved
those in high places in society, involving allegations
against both the dead (ex-Prime Minister Edward Heath
or entertainer Jimmy Saville, for example) and the liv-
ing. Several celebrities are currently serving lengthy
sentences for offences carried out many years ago: for
example, in 2014, three famous individuals were impris-
oned for sexual offending dating back many years. Rolf
* Nicola Padfield, MA, Dip Crim, DES, Reader in Criminal and Penal Jus-
tice, University of Cambridge. I thank Michiel van der Wolf for involv-
ing me in this project and for his many useful insights and comments.
This article is part of a comparative research project involving several
European jurisdictions, of which the results are presented in this special
issue. For further background of the theme and outline of the issue and
individual articles, as well as the comparative analysis, see the contribu-
tion by Van der Wolf in this issue.
1. See Van der Wolf (this issue).
Harris, an entertainer and artist, once a well-loved
‘national treasure’, is now serving a five-year, nine-
month sentence imposed for offences carried out
between 1968 and 1986; Max Clifford, a famous publi-
cist, is serving eight years and is now facing further
charges; and Stuart Hall, a TV and radio presenter, was
convicted at two separate trials and served two consecu-
tive periods of thirty months’ imprisonment.
There has also been enormous media coverage sur-
rounding the grooming and rape of vulnerable girls by
‘rings’ of, often, British Muslim or Pakistani-heritage
men: perhaps the most famous was the Rotherham scan-
dal: five men were found guilty of many offences com-
mitted between 1997 and 2013 involving the grooming
and rape of vulnerable teenage girls. The men were sen-
tenced in 2010 to between four and eleven years’ impris-
onment. Much of the press coverage has focused on the
failure of the public authorities to act effectively against
widespread sexual abuse against vulnerable girls.2 There
have been other similar and more recent convictions
resulting from ‘rings’ of sexual offenders in Derby
(2010), Rochdale (2012), Oxford (2013), Telford (2013),
Bristol (2014) Banbury (2015) and Peterborough (2014,
2015). Most recently, in July 2015, six Asian men from
Aylesbury were convicted of serious sexual offences
against schoolgirls and were sentenced in September to
lengthy terms of imprisonment, up to nineteen-and-a-
half years. Similar prosecutions have started in Newcas-
tle. There has also been a trail of scandals surrounding
sex abuse by priests of various churches.3
These gangs, and the celebrities, attract enormous
media attention, but it is difficult to prove any direct
link between media portrayals and the number of sex
offenders convicted and sent to prison, which has been
rising steadily. Sex offenders now make up 17% of the
prison population:
At the end of June 2015 there were 11,490 sentenced
sex offenders in the prison population, which is 10%
higher than twelve months before, and 33% higher
when compared to June 2010. Furthermore, when
2. See e.g. A. Jay, ‘The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation
in Rotherham 1997-2014’, OBE, available at: <www. rotherham. gov. uk/
downloads/ file/ 1407/ independent_ inquiry_ cse_ in_ rotherham>.
3. There is now a major public inquiry into institutional child sexual abuse,
chaired by a New Zealand judge, Lowell Goddard, which is scheduled to
take many years and to cost millions of pounds: see <www. csa -inquiry.
independent. gov. uk/ about -the -inquiry>.
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compared to the sentenced populations for other
offence groups, the sex offender sentenced popula-
tion has increased the most over this five year period.
This is consistent with the recent ‘Crime in England
and Wales’ bulletin from the Office for National Sta-
tistics that reported the highest number of sexual
offences recorded by the police since 2002/03, for the
year ending March 2015 (p. 6, Offender Management
Statistics Bulletin, England and Wales, Quarterly
January to March 2015).4
So, more offences are being reported to the police, more
offenders are being convicted and offenders are also
serving longer sentences. Of course, it is difficult to
know whether there are more sex offenders in society, or
whether victims and complainants are simply more pre-
pared to come forward than was the case in earlier
times. The political response would appear to have been
largely one of passing more and more laws,5 and the
judiciary has responded, as these statistics show, by
passing longer and longer sentences.
The focus of this article is on the control of sex offend-
ers in the community. I shall highlight a number of key
characteristics of, and worrying developments in, the
English system: a flexible and risk-averse prison release
system; growing numbers of offenders recalled to prison
after release on licence; an uncomfortable relationship
between mental health law and penal law. These devel-
opments must all be evaluated, for our purposes, in the
context of growing euro-scepticism and widespread
wariness of a culture of human rights. The questions
raised are important and under-researched: 11,490 sen-
tenced sex offenders in the prison population today is an
enormous number, and there are currently 65,083
offenders subject to Multi-Agency Public Protection
Arrangements (MAPPA) in the community.6 To what
extent is ‘control’ in the community either effective or
necessary? Attempting to change attitudes within soci-
ety might be a more appropriate response.
1.2 Overview
Public protection has been high on the political agenda
in England for many years, which has resulted in much
legislative change. It is difficult to describe the current
law with simplicity or with clarity. Many sex offenders
are serving indeterminate sentences. When (if) released
from prison, they will be subject to licence conditions,
probably for life. But even those who are sentenced to
4. See Ministry of Justice, ‘Offender Management Statistics Quarterly:
January to March 2015’ (2015), available at: <www. gov. uk/
government/ statistics/ offender -management -statistics -quarterly -january
-to -march -2015>. See also Ministry of Justice, Story of the Prison Pop-
ulation 1993 – 2012 England and Wales (2013), at <www. justice. gov.
uk/ statistics/ prisons -and -probation/ prison -population -1993 -2012>.
5. Every year, there is a significant statutory change: see the changes in
the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 discussed later
in this article for a recent example.
6. MAPPA data in this article come from the Ministry of Justice, Multi-
Agency Public Protection Arrangements Annual Report 2013/14
(2014), available at: <www. gov. uk/ government/ uploads/ system/
uploads/ attachment_ data/ file/ 369414/ mappa -annual -report -2013 -14.
pdf>.
determinate, fixed term, sentences (and who are nor-
mally released at the halfway point) will be subject not
only to licence conditions until the end of their sen-
tence, but also to other preventative orders. All sex
offenders have been required to register with the police
since the Sex Offenders Act 1997, which resulted in the
setting up of a sex offenders’ register. This register is
now known as the Violent and Sex Offender Register
(ViSOR), and the rules governing registration are found
in the Sexual Offences Act 2003, as amended. The reg-
ister is managed by the National Crime Agency, a polic-
ing body created by the Crime and Courts Act 2013.7
The length of time that sex offenders are required to
maintain their details on the register is not short. Any-
one imprisoned for thirty months or more must remain
on the register indefinitely. Notification periods are as
follows:
– Imprisonment for a fixed period of thirty months or
more, imprisonment for an indefinite period, impris-
onment for public protection (IPP), or admission to
hospital under restriction order, or subject to an
Order for Lifelong Restriction: indefinitely.
– Imprisonment for more than six months but less than
thirty months: ten years.
– Imprisonment for six months or less, or admission to
hospital without restriction order: seven years.
– Caution: two years.
– Conditional discharge or (in Scotland) a probation
order: period of discharge or probation.
– Any other: five years.
(Finite notification periods are halved if the person is
under eighteen when convicted or cautioned). In R (on
the application of F and Thompson) v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 17, the Supreme
Court upheld an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal
and issued a declaration of incompatibility under section
4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 in respect of notifica-
tion requirements for an indefinite period. These indefi-
nite notification requirements were, they said, dispro-
portionate. As a result, the Government has introduced
a review and appeal process for those who have been on
the register for more than fifteen years, or eight years
for juveniles (see the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Reme-
dial) Order 2012). Those who continue to pose a signifi-
cant risk will still remain on the register for life. Those
subject to a Sexual Offences Prevention Order (SOPO;
see later) may not apply for a review of their indefinite
notification requirements.8
The register is of course useful for the police, and other
agencies, in order to ‘manage’ sex offenders in the com-
munity. How is this done? We must identify a number
of routes for supervision:
7. A subject outside the scope of this article is the accountability of the
police in England and Wales: there have been many changes in recent
years, reflecting tensions between local and national accountability, and
different understandings of the importance of police ‘independence’.
8. See ‘Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Remedial) Order 2012’, available at:
<www. gov. uk/ government/ publications/ sexual -offences -act -2003 -
remedial -order -2012>.
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1. supervision in the community for those still serving a
sentence of imprisonment, or those serving commun-
ity-based punishments,
2. post-sentence supervision under MAPPA,
3. civil preventative orders (breaches of which are crim-
inal offences).
Before exploring these measures, I will offer some com-
ments on the context in which they apply. There is dis-
appointingly little empirical evidence available and the
issues are seriously under-debated: for example why
does public protection justify post-sentence ‘punish-
ment’? What, in fact, do we mean by ‘post-sentence’
punishment – if the offender is still being ‘controlled’,
should this be considered as post-sentence or as part of
the punishment, part of the sentence?
2 Evaluation in the Light of
Legal Theory
English law has long been ambivalent about the justifi-
cations for sentencing – or perhaps, simply recognises a
plethora of sometimes contradictory justifications.
When Parliament enacted section 142 of the Criminal
Justice Act 2003, most judges were unimpressed. It
enacted for the first time the provision that any court
sentencing an offender must have with regard to the fol-
lowing purposes of sentencing:
a. the punishment of offenders,
b. the reduction of crime (including its reduction by
deterrence),
c. the reform and rehabilitation of offenders,
d. the protection of the public and
e. the making of reparation by offenders to persons
affected by their offences.
This appeared to most sentencers to be a statement of
the ‘blindingly obvious’.9 Sentencers knew (and know)
that sentencing involves a complicated balancing of con-
flicting aims. Since the Criminal Justice Act 1991, judg-
es have been urged to impose proportionate, or com-
mensurate, sentences in the sense that a ‘custodial sen-
tence must be for the shortest term (not exceeding the
permitted maximum) that in the opinion of the court is
commensurate with the seriousness of the offence, or
the combination of the offence and one or more offences
associated with it’ (s. 153(2) Criminal Justice Act 2003),
but it is difficult to articulate how this is applied in prac-
tice. Even in 1991, sentencers were entitled to impose
‘longer than commensurate’ sentences on some offend-
ers, and the shorthand concept of ‘dangerousness’ has
been used since the Criminal Justice Act 2003. It would
be useful to have research that analysed which of the
9. This has been stated to me several times at judicial training conferences;
the reality may be more dangerous – does the legislation perpetuate
certain myths? For example, severe sentences do not themselves deter
offenders: more important is the certainty, or subjective assessment of
the likelihood, of being arrested and prosecuted.
purposes of punishment are taken into account more
often, and by which judges and for which offences
(although, of course, what judges say they do may not
be what they actually do). When it comes to serious sex
offenders, it is possible to assume that the courts may
put particular weight on punishment and protection of
the public, not reform and rehabilitation, but this is not
known.
Quite apart from the legislative framework, there is a
lively academic and largely theoretical debate on the
purposes of punishment. It is difficult to know how
much influence this has had on Parliament or practice.
Andreas von Hirsch’s work10 had a significant influence
in the 1990s when versions of modern retributivism
replaced reform and rehabilitation as preferred theoreti-
cal aims for the system. It is perhaps a challenge for
those of us who seek to put rehabilitation at the heart of
the system today that we must recognise that reform
and rehabilitation went out of fashion in the 1980s and
1990s for good reasons: not least, a fear of inconsistent
sentencing. However, most of the discussion focuses on
the purposes of punishment at the first sentencing stage,
what might be called ‘front door’ sentencing – there has
been little debate on the philosophical justifications for
early release and control in the community post-sen-
tence. When it comes to preparing prisoners for release,
the uncertainties make ‘progress’ through the system
more difficult to achieve. Is public protection more
important than rehabilitation? Until we give rehabilita-
tion a greater priority, people will continue to get ‘stuck’
in the system.
Interestingly, the concept of rehabilitation seems to be
more often discussed in the context of the many appeals
against deportation imposed on foreign nationals who
have served lengthy custodial sentences, than in the sen-
tencing cases themselves.11 I would argue that rehabili-
tation is highly relevant to the reduction in the risk of
re-offending: if a person is rehabilitated, the public are
safer. Rehabilitation and public protection march
together more easily than often assumed.
10. See e.g. A. von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and Dan-
gerousness in the Sentencing of Criminals (1987) or A. von Hirsch,
Censure and Sanctions (1996).
11. See e.g. Taylor v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015]
EWCA Civ 845, where the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) upheld the
deportation of a Colombian woman. Moore-Bick concluded, ‘I would
certainly not wish to diminish the importance of rehabilitation in itself,
but the cases in which it can make a significant contribution to estab-
lishing the compelling reasons sufficient to outweigh the public interest
in deportation are likely to be rare. The fact that rehabilitation has
begun but is as yet incomplete has been held in general not to be a rel-
evant factor … rehabilitation is relevant primarily to the reduction in the
risk of re-offending. It is less relevant to the other factors which contrib-
ute to the public interest in deportation’ (at para. 21).
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3 Legal Frameworks for
Indeterminate Supervision:
Evaluation of Proportionality
What is meant by indeterminate supervision? Most seri-
ous sex offenders who are convicted serve lengthy cus-
todial sentences, and it is essential to understand the
mechanisms whereby they find themselves in due
course ‘supervised’ in the community. This ‘supervi-
sion’ may be indeterminate, via a number of different
routes.
3.1 The Sentencing Framework
3.1.1 Life Sentences
Many sex offenders in England receive an indeterminate
sentence. This was particularly common between 2003
and 2012, when the option of IPP existed. From April
2005 to July 2008, IPP was more or less mandatory for a
repeat rapist or indeed for anyone convicted of one of
many sex offences who in the eyes of the court posed a
‘serious risk of serious harm’. There are therefore many
sex offenders serving IPP in prison (and some in the
community), and it will remain a relevant sentence for
the rest of their lives. (After ten years on licence post-
release, an IPP prisoner may apply to have his licence
conditions lifted, but no one has yet been in a position to
do this.) There is also a ‘discretionary life sentence’ that
is imposed on very serious offenders. For example, in
May 2015, the Court of Appeal upheld four life senten-
ces imposed on the four men convicted in the ‘Oxford’
sex ring case mentioned in the Introduction: see Karrar
[2015] EWCA Crim 850.12 The Court of Appeal held
that life sentences, with minimum terms ranging from
seventeen to twelve years, were appropriate for these
men who had been involved in the serious sexual exploi-
tation of vulnerable young teenage girls over a number
of years. A little guidance on when a life sentence is
appropriate was given by the Court of Appeal in PG
[2104] EWCA Crim 1221, updating earlier guidance
given by Bingham LJ in AG’s Reference No. 32 of 1996
(Whittaker) [1997] 1 Cr App R(S) 261. The case of PG
involved a 64-year-old policeman who had abused his
position as a scuba-diving instructor over ten years to
lure young boys into sexual activity and then abused his
position as a police officer to hide what he had done. He
was also convicted of the anal rape of his wife. The
Court, led by the current Lord Chief Justice, substitu-
ted a determinate sentence of twenty years for the trial
judge’s life sentence, with a minimum term of twelve
years. But it is a difficult case from which to draw clear
guidance as there had been procedural errors at trial and
the Court held that it would, on the basis of this, be
12. The trial judges sentencing remarks are available at: <www. judiciary.
gov. uk/ judgments/ dogar -and -others -sentencing -remarks/>. The judge-
ment of the Court of Appeal is available free of charge on <www. bailii.
org>. Most academics and law students rely on the commercial provid-
ers of law reports: mainly Westlaw and LexisNexis.
‘unfair, unsafe and unjust’ for the Court of Appeal to set
about making the finding of ‘dangerousness’ on the
material available to them, which should have been done
by the trial judge. But the Court did repeat the words of
Lord Bingham that discretionary life sentences should
be passed only in the most exceptional circumstances
and that there should be good grounds for believing that
the offender may be a serious danger to the public for a
period that cannot be reliably estimated at the date of
sentence.
3.1.2 Extended Sentences
Many of those who might well have received an indeter-
minate IPP between 2003 and 2012, when it was abol-
ished, now receive an ‘extended sentence’. The current
style of extended sentence was introduced in the Crimi-
nal Justice Act 2003 but these sentences did not become
common until 2008, as ‘dangerous’ offenders were until
then likely to fall foul of the draconian IPP provisions
and to receive a truly indeterminate sentence. The
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 made IPP
much more discretionary – and judges were then able to
impose an extended sentence rather than one that was
totally indeterminate on many offenders who they con-
sidered ‘dangerous’. With an extended sentence, the
judge imposes the ‘appropriate custodial term’, but then
adds an extended supervision period of up to five years
for violent offenders and up to eight years for sexual
offenders.
The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offend-
ers Act 2012 abolished both IPP and the 2003-style
Extended Sentence (now known within the prison world
as an EPP, an extended sentence for public protection)
and replaced them with a new form of Extended Deter-
minate Sentence (now known as an EDS). The main
change concerned release, as we will see later. But the
EDS is becoming common as judges will frequently
consider a sex offender to pose a serious risk of serious
harm, the current test of ‘dangerousness’. A recent and
interesting example is the case of the Cambridge doctor
who pleaded guilty to many sex offences committed
against boys under his professional care in hospital
(unnecessary genital examinations): see Bradbury [2015]
EWCA Crim 1176. The trial judge imposed a total sen-
tence of twenty-two years, stating that he was satisfied
that this offered sufficient protection for the public such
that he did not need to impose an extended sentence.
He also imposed a lifelong SOPO.13 But the Court of
Appeal decided to ‘restructure’ the sentence so that the
‘custodial element’ would be sixteen years, and added to
the total term an extension licence period of six years.
There is much that can be said of this case,14 but for our
purposes, it serves as an example of the lengthy senten-
ces imposed on sex offenders. Bradbury will not be con-
sidered for release until he has served over ten years.
13. See later.
14. See N. Padfield, ‘Bradbury: A Tangle of Extended Sentences?’ Current
Sentencing Practice News 2, at 5-8 (2015).
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3.1.3 Determinate Sentences
All those sex offenders who the court decides do not
require life or an extended sentence, but who cross the
so-called ‘custody threshold’ will receive a determinate
sentence, fixed in line with guidelines published by the
Sentencing Council, in particular the Definitive Guide-
line on Sexual Offences,15 and with reference to the guid-
ance from the Court of Appeal. The most serious rapes
involve a starting point of fifteen years custody, within a
category range of thirteen to nineteen years. The least
serious (itself a contentious area) involve a starting point
of five years, in a category range of four to seven years’
custody. The guidelines identify many aggravating and
mitigating factors that, in seeking to control judicial dis-
cretion, have turned sentencing law into a particularly
complex area. See, for a recent example, AG’s Reference
Nos. 2 and 13 of 2015 of 2015 (McClaren and Whitelaw)
[2015] EWCA Crim 1223 where the Court of Appeal
held that sentences of nine years’ imprisonment were
neither unduly lenient nor manifestly excessive for two
offenders, both aged twenty-one, who had raped an
intoxicated 18-year-old woman in an alleyway outside a
nightclub (the main argument at trial had turned on
whether she was capable of giving consent). The Court
held that it had been appropriate not to impose a con-
secutive sentence for digital anal penetration by one of
the offenders (this was a prosecution appeal). They were
young men with no previous convictions: the judgement
focused on where they should be placed on the guideline
(in Category 2A) – there is no discussion of ‘dangerous-
ness’ or SOPOs. Nine years was an appropriate sen-
tence.
3.2 Release from Prison
As this article requires a debate of supervision in the
community, we will move swiftly over the way sex
offenders progress (or do not progress) through the
prison system, although it is well worth noting the fact
that now there are so many sex offenders in the system,
many spend much of their time in specialist prisons and
they are not simply segregated as ‘vulnerable offenders’
in separate wings in mainstream prisons. The prison
system is under extraordinary pressure as the Govern-
ment works hard to ‘save’ huge sums of money in the
criminal justice system.16 There has been little research
15. See ‘Sexual Offences Definitive Guideline’, available at: <www.
sentencingcouncil. org. uk/ wp -content/ uploads/ Final_ Sexual_ Offences_
Definitive_ Guideline_ content_ web1. pdf>.
16. See HM’s Chief Inspector of Prisons Annual Report 2014-15, available
at: <www. justiceinspectorates. gov. uk/ hmiprisons/ inspections/ annual -
report -2014 -15/ #. VcDNEqbbn0d>. It makes grim reading. ‘Assessed
outcomes in the prisons we reported on in 2014-15 fell sharply across
all areas and, overall, the outcomes we reported on in 2014-15 were
the worst for 10 years’ (at page 10). The Report speaks of rising levels
of violence: ‘more prisoners were murdered, killed themselves, self-
harmed and were victims of assaults than five years ago. There were
more serious assaults and the number of assaults and serious assaults
against staff also rose’ (page 8). Particularly worrying is the ‘dismal pic-
ture’ of purposeful activity and of staff shortages: as the Inspector says
‘It is hard to imagine anything less likely to rehabilitate prisoners than
days spent mostly lying on their bunks in squalid cells watching daytime
TV’ (page 13).
specifically on the perceptions of sex offenders in pris-
on, although Iewins’ work stands out.17 It would be use-
ful to know much more about the delays faced by sex
offenders hoping to be transferred to prisons of lower
levels of security and about the damage caused by the
fact that many wait for years to take courses that have
been deemed essential. But we focus here on the release
and supervision of offenders in the community.18
3.2.1 Supervision in the Community for Those Still
Serving a Sentence of Imprisonment, or for Those
Serving Community-Based Punishments
Those serving life (which includes IPP prisoners) are
only released from prison following the direction of the
cautious Parole Board.19 They are considered for release
once they have served their minimum term. They are
unlikely to be released unless they have progressed
through the prison system satisfactorily, completing rel-
evant courses, and have spent time in an ‘open’ prison.
They will also need the support of their Offender Man-
ager (a probation officer) who will have prepared a
release plan.
The rules on release of extended sentence prisoners
have changed extraordinarily frequently, which makes it
difficult for staff and prisoners to understand the rules
and, of course, leads to feelings of injustice: over the
past ten years, some extended sentence prisoners have
been eligible to be released automatically at the halfway
point in their sentence (which is the rule for those serv-
ing determinate sentences); some have been released at
the discretion of the Parole Board, considered first when
they had reached the halfway point. The current posi-
tion is that most will not be considered for release until
they have reached the two-thirds point. They are not to
be released unless the Parole Board is satisfied that ‘it is
no longer necessary for the protection of the public’ that
they should be confined (s. 246A(6) of the Criminal Jus-
tice Act 2003, as amended). This reverse burden seems
to imply that more EDS prisoners (such as Bradbury,
discussed earlier) will stay in prison for the whole of the
custodial part of the sentence.
All prisoners, whenever released, will be subject to
licence conditions. One of the most worrying aspects of
supervision in the community is the rate at which it
fails, and offenders are recalled to prison. The recall rate
17. See A. Ievins, ‘Living Among Sex Offenders: Identity, Safety and Rela-
tionships at Whatton Prison’ (2015), available at: <https://
d19ylpo4aovc7m. cloudfront. net/ fileadmin/ howard_ league/ user/ pdf/
Publications/ Living_ among_ sex_ offenders. pdf>, which explores experi-
ences related to safety, the management of identity, the development
of hierarchies and the formation and maintenance of friendships within
a prison that only holds sex offenders.
18. For European comparisons, see N. Padfield, D. van Zyl Smit & F. Dünkel
(eds.), Release from Prison: European Policy and Practice (2010).
19. For annual statistics, see the Parole Board’s annual reports, the most
recent of which is available at: <www. gov. uk/ government/ publications/
the -parole -board -for -england -and -wales -annual -report -2014 -to
-2015>; and N. Padfield (ed.), Who to Release? Parole, Fairness and
Criminal Justice (2007); N. Padfield, ‘Sanctions against Dangerous
Offenders in England and Wales: Does More Mean Better?’ in C. Villa-
campa (ed.), Protección jurídico-penal de la libertad e indemnidad sex-
ual de los menores (2015), at 481-511.
59
Nicola Padfield doi: 10.5553/ELR.000062 - ELR December 2016 | No. 2
This article from Erasmus Law Review is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to anonieme bezoeker
has been rising for years, and the latest statistics state
that the recall population has increased by 17% in the
past twelve months.20 It is not at all clear why this hap-
pened. Certainly, there are huge changes going on with
the fragmentation of the National Probation Service and
the recent creation of Community Rehabilitation Com-
panies, which now carry out 70% of the work previously
done by probation service staff.21 And the Offender
Rehabilitation Act (ORA) 2014 has expanded licence
supervision so that anyone sentenced to more than a day
in prison will receive at least twelve months supervision
on release. But this came into effect only for those who
were sentenced after 1 February 2015. Accordingly, on
30 June 2015, 157 prisoners were recorded as being
recalled under ORA 2014, representing only 3% of the
recall population. Offenders may be recalled not only
because they are alleged to have re-offended, but also if
there is any deterioration in behaviour that leads the
National Offender Management Service (NOMS) to
decide that there is an increased risk of the offender
committing further offences. Figures on sex offenders
recalled are difficult to identify: but on MAPPA figures
(see next section), we learn that in 2013/2014, 850 Level
2 and Level 3 MAPPA eligible offenders (i.e. higher risk
sex offenders) were returned to custody for breach of
their licence, a decrease of 6% from the previous year.
This continues the overall downward trend since
2007/2008 and is consistent with the reduction in the
number of offenders managed at this level, not necessa-
rily reflecting an overall reduction in numbers. But at
the same time, it would appear that there has been a
sharp increase in the sentencing of sex offenders in the
community for breach of SOPOs (see the following).
Supervisors and managers are likely to be particularly
‘risk averse’ when it comes to sex offenders, and the
subject has not received adequate academic or other
scrutiny. Research could usefully explore when and how
sex offenders are dealt with under MAPPA, SOPO or
on licence.22 What the official licence statistics reveal is
a priority concern that those who are recalled are
returned swiftly to prison and are not ‘lost’ to the sys-
tem:
Between April 1999 and March 2015, 190,714 of
those released on licence were recalled to custody for
breaching the conditions of their licence, e.g. failing
to report to their probation officer. Of all those recal-
led over the period, 99.4% were returned by the end
of June 2015. In the latest quarter there were 4,240
20. Offender Management Statistics Bulletin, England and Wales Quarterly
January to March 2015, Ministry of Justice, Statistical Bulletin, 30 July
2015, available at: <www. gov. uk/ government/ uploads/ system/
uploads/ attachment_ data/ file/ 449528/ offender -management -statistics
-bulletin -jan -mar -2015. pdf> (last visited 27 May 2016).
21. See N. Padfield, ‘The Magnitude of the Offender Rehabilitation and
“Through the Gate” Resettlement Revolution’, Criminal Law Review
99 (2016).
22. See final section, and my study of recalled offenders, N. Padfield,
‘Understanding Recall 2011’, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Law
Research Paper No. 2/2013. Available at SSRN: <http:// ssrn. com/
abstract= 2201039 or http:// dx. doi. org/ 10. 2139/ ssrn. 2201039>.
recalls, which included the recall of 112 offenders
who were serving custodial sentences of less than
twelve months. The ORA expanded licence supervi-
sion meaning that it is now possible to recall these
offenders to custody.
Of all those released on licence and recalled to custo-
dy between April 1999 and March 2015, there were
1,135 who had not been returned to custody by the
end of June 2015. This includes 4 people who had
been recalled after a sentence of less than 12 months.
The proportion of prisoners not returned to custody
over this period is 0.6% and this is a relatively con-
stant figure when compared to previous years. A fur-
ther 18 offenders had not been returned to custody as
of 30 June 2015 after recall between 1984 and April
1999, meaning the total number of offenders not
returned to custody at the end of June 2015 was
1,153. These figures include some offenders believed
to be dead or living abroad but who have not been
confirmed as dead or deported.
Of the 1,153 not returned to custody by 30 June
2015, 147 had originally been serving a prison sen-
tence for violence against the person offences and a
further 40 for sexual offences.23
Thus, the focus of the official statistics is on the ‘suc-
cess’ of recall. But more relevant may be studies of how
difficult it can be for sex offenders to ‘succeed’ on
licence.24 The reality of living life on licence has been
discussed in a few academic research projects. Clearly,
many offenders struggle to live with their stigmatisation
as sex offenders, and complying with the demands of a
licence is a significant challenge.25 As we shall now see,
life on licence may be made even more challenging by
the constraints also imposed by MAPPA (see next sec-
tion).
3.2.2 Post-Sentence Supervision under MAPPA
MAPPA exist in each of the forty-two criminal justice
areas in England and Wales. These are extraordinary
bodies, legally speaking: simply ‘arrangements’ designed
to help protect the public from serious harm by sexual
and violent offenders. They require local criminal jus-
tice agencies and other bodies dealing with offenders to
work together in partnership in dealing with these
23. Ministry of Justice (2015), above n. 20, at 12.
24. N. Padfield, ‘Recalling Conditionally Released Prisoners in England and
Wales’, 4 European Journal of Probation 34, at 34-45 (2012); Editorial
to that special issue, available at: <www. ejprob. ro/ index. pl/ recalling_
conditionally_ released_ prisoners_ in_ england_ and_ wales>.
25. See C. Appleton, Life after Life Imprisonment (2010); L. Digard, ‘When
Legitimacy Is Denied: Offender Perceptions of the Prison Recall Sys-
tem’, Probation Journal 57, at 43-61 (2010), Padfield, above n. 22.
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offenders. The ‘responsible authorities’ of the MAPPA
include26
– The National Probation Service
– Her Majesty’s Prison Service
– Police forces.27
MAPPA, which are coordinated by the Public Protec-
tion Unit of NOMS within the Ministry of Justice, were
introduced by Criminal Justice and Court Services Act
2000 and strengthened by Criminal Justice Act 2003.
They evolved from professional practice during the
1990s, which recognised that there should be more
‘joined-up’ work with dangerous offenders. The MAP-
PA process involves an assessment of risk posed by an
offender, upon which a risk management plan is subse-
quently based. Offenders posing the highest risk are
referred to a Multi-Agency Public Protection panel
meeting, where the offender’s risk and management
plan is discussed with the participating agencies.28
Although each area is required to publish an annual
MAPPA Report, it is difficult to know how effective
they are in practice. For example the most recent report
from Cambridgeshire provides two case studies.29 The
first is that of a man serving a life sentence for commit-
ting a sexually motivated murder: ‘Whilst he remains
monitored, his motivation to lead a law abiding life
offers the best protection the community can have’. The
second was the story of a man released at the end of his
sentence, having been recalled to prison when he was on
a licence:
He continues to pose a high risk of harm to the pub-
lic, particularly children and the vulnerable. He has
to abide by a Court imposed Order that prohibits him
from having contact with potential victims. To help
him avoid offending after many years in prisons and
hospital, Mr F was given substantial support by the
NPS, Housing and other agencies. At the same time,
the police worked with probation to monitor his pro-
gress. Mr F broke the Order, was arrested and is now
serving a further substantial prison sentence.
These are not, I suspect, untypical stories of ‘success’
and ‘failure’. But what we do not have is any real evi-
26. The published guidance is dated: the latest version is called 2012, ver-
sion 4, updated from the 2009 version. See <www. justice. gov. uk/
downloads/ offenders/ mappa/ mappa -guidance -2012 -part1. pdf>. This
does not take into account recent changes in the law and practice of
supervision since the ORA 2014. Some insights can be gained by read-
ing the annual reports of different MAPPA in the country: see <www.
gov. uk/ government/ collections/ multi -agency -public -protection -
arrangements -mappa -annual -reports>.
27. A number of other agencies are under a duty to co-operate with the
‘Responsible Authority’. These include Children’s Services, Adult Social
Services, Health Trusts and Authorities, Youth Offending Teams, UK
Border Agency, local housing authorities and certain registered social
landlords, Jobcentre Plus and electronic monitoring providers.
28. A useful summary is found in M. Peck, Patterns of Reconviction among
Offenders Eligible for Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements
(MAPPA), Ministry of Justice Research Series 6/11 (2011).
29. See ‘Cambridgeshire-MAPPA Annual Report 2013-14’, available at:
<www. gov. uk/ government/ uploads/ system/ uploads/ attachment_ data/
file/ 368913/ Cambridgeshire_ -_ MAPPA_ Annual_ Report_ 2013 -14. pdf>.
dence that MAPPA work ‘properly’. There has been
some research.30 Peck’s study showed a reduction in
reconviction rates among sexual and violent offenders
released between 2001 and 2004 compared to
1998-2000, which coincided with the introduction of
MAPPA in 2001. But of course this cannot evaluate the
specific impact of MAPPA on reconvictions. In any
case, reconviction is a blunt measure of re-offending.
And, more importantly from our perspective, is MAP-
PA supervision ‘proportionate’?
A huge number of offenders are monitored under MAP-
PA. On 31 March 2014, there were 65,083 MAPPA-eli-
gible offenders, of whom 71% were registered sex
offenders.31 They are divided into one of three levels:
– Level 1 – Ordinary Agency Management (informa-
tion will usually be exchanged between relevant agen-
cies, especially between police and probation, but for-
mal multi-agency meetings will not be held to discuss
the offender’s case).
– Level 2 – Active Multi-Agency Management (the
risk management plans for these offenders require the
active involvement of several agencies via regular
multi-agency public protection meetings).
– Level 3 – Active Multi-Agency Management (as with
offenders managed at Level 2, the active involvement
of several agencies is required; however, the risk pre-
sented by offenders managed at Level 3 means that
the involvement of senior staff from those agencies is
additionally required to authorise the use of addition-
al resources, such as for specialised accommodation).
The majority of sex offenders are managed at Level 1.
In 2013/2014, there were 2,238 sex offenders being
managed at Level 2, and only 244 being managed at
Level 3. All sex offenders are nowadays on the sex
offender register, i.e. they are required to notify the
police of certain details, with further notification
required if any of those details change. A breach of this
notification requirement is itself a criminal offence and
can lead to a caution or conviction. The number of cate-
gory 1 offenders who were cautioned or convicted for
breaches of their notification requirement was 2,057 in
2013/2014, or 4.5 offenders cautioned or convicted per
100 offenders. This is a 31% rise from 2012/2013 when
there were 1,576 offenders who were cautioned or con-
victed, and is the highest level for up to eight years.
The notification requirements are seriously enforced:
the number of sex offenders who were cautioned or con-
victed for breaches of their notification requirement was
2,057 in 2013/2014, or 4.5 offenders cautioned or con-
victed per 100 offenders. This was a surprising 31% rise
from 2012/2013 (and as we shall see later, the number
of people sent to prison for breaching SOPOs is also ris-
ing sharply). Thus, MAPPA and the notification
requirements would seem to be used by managers to
control sex offenders in the community. We turn now to
30. J. Wood and H. Kemshall, The Operation and experience of MAPPA
(Home Office Online report 12/07, 2007); Peck, above n. 28.
31. Ministry of Justice (2014), above n. 6.
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a closely related regime: the use of civil orders, breaches
of which are criminal offences.
3.2.3 Civil Preventative Orders
Part II of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 introduced
SOPOs (which were not restricted only to sex offend-
ers).32 They could be imposed by a sentencing judge as a
consequence of conviction, or the police could apply
separately to a court for a SOPO in relation to anyone
convicted of over 200 offences listed in Schedules 3 and
4 of the Act. Before making a SOPO, the court had to be
satisfied that it was necessary to protect the public or
any particular member of the public from serious sexual
harm. This was defined as protecting the public in the
UK or any particular members of the public from seri-
ous physical or psychological harm, caused by the
defendant committing any of the offences listed in
Schedule 3 of the Act – section 106(3) Sexual Offences
Act 2003. Breach of the requirements attached to a
SOPO is a criminal offence. As we shall see, in 2015
SOPOs were replaced by similar, but broader, SHPOs
(Sexual Harm Prevention Orders). But let us look first
at some data on SOPOs.
In 2013/2014, the courts imposed 3,243 SOPOs, com-
pared to 3,064 in 2012/2013. This was an increase of
6%, which continued the year on year rise, reflecting
the increased use of SOPOs by police. There were 178
Level 2 and Level 3 MAPPA offenders sent to custody
for breach of their SOPO. This was a sharp increase of
34% from 133 in 2012/2013. In 2013/2014, there were
7.2% of Level 2 and Level 3 offenders sent to custody
for breach of their SOPO, which is a significant increase
from 2012/2013 when the figure was 4.8%.33
There has been a significant amount of litigation sur-
rounding SOPOs: largely in connection with appeals
against sentence, and focused on questions of propor-
tionality and the reasonableness and clarity of individual
conditions. Useful guidance was given in Smith [2015]
EWCA Crim 1772, where the Court of Appeal consid-
ered four separate cases and gave guidance for future
cases. Thus, they say that those sentenced to an indeter-
minate sentence do not need a SOPO, unless there was
some very unusual feature that meant that such an order
could add something useful and did not run the risk of
undesirably tying the hands of the offender managers
later (since the offender will be on indeterminate
licence).
By contrast, a SOPO may plainly be necessary if the
sentence is a determinate term or an extended term.
In each of those cases, whilst conditions may be
attached to the licence, that licence will have a
defined and limited life. The SOPO by contrast can
extend beyond it and this may be necessary to protect
the public from further offences and serious sexual
harm as a result.
32. S. Shute, ‘The New Civil Preventative Orders’, Criminal Law Review
417 (2004).
33. Ministry of Justice (2014), above n. 6, at 15.
The same is true, only more clearly, where the sen-
tence is a suspended sentence. The SOPO serves a
different purpose from the suspension of the sen-
tence, and its duration is certain to be longer, since it
cannot be made unless prohibitions for at least five
years are called for: s 107(1)(b) (paras. 14-15).
In terms of specific conditions, the Court of Appeal said
that
A blanket prohibition on computer use or internet
access is impermissible. It is disproportionate because
it restricts the defendant in the use of what is nowa-
days an essential part of everyday living for a large
proportion of the public, as well as a requirement of
much employment. Before the creation of the inter-
net, if a defendant kept books of pictures of child
pornography it would not have occurred to anyone to
ban him from possession of all printed material. The
internet is a modern equivalent (para. 20).
Thus, it is now recognised that a total, blanket, ban on
computer use is disproportionate. Another common
term prevents offenders from socialising or working
with children. But such a term must be justified as
required beyond the restrictions anyhow placed upon
sex offenders working with children. The Disclosure
and Barring Service (DBS) carries out criminal record
checks for specific positions, professions, employment,
offices, works and licences included in the Rehabilita-
tion of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975 and
those prescribed in the Police Act 1997 (Criminal
Records) regulations.34 Sex offenders are thus in any
case banned from engaging in any form of teaching,
training or instruction of children, and any form of care,
advice, guidance or therapy, and from acting as a driver
for children’s activities. The Court of Appeal suggested
that judges should ordinarily require the Crown to justi-
fy an application for a SOPO term relating to activity
with children by demonstrating the risk that is not
already catered for by the wider DBS law.
A recent example is Gass [2015] EWCA Crim 579. A
28-year-old man, convicted of offences of sexual activity
with a 14-year-old female family friend and sentenced to
seven years’ imprisonment, challenged an indeterminate
order that included the following terms, prohibiting him
from:
a. ‘seeking or undertaking employment including vol-
untary work, whether for payment or otherwise
which is likely at some time to allow him unsuper-
vised access to a child under the age of 16 years
(where that contact is more than transient and a child
or a young person’s parents or guardian is absent)’;
b. ‘seeking the company of or being inadvertently in the
sole company of any person under the age of 16 years
34. The DBS replaced the Independent Safeguarding Authority that had
been created by the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 – see
the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Those who wish to work with
children are required to have a DBS check: see <www. gov. uk/
government/ publications/ dbs -check -eligible -positions -guidance>.
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in the absence of that child or young person’s parents
or guardian’. The Court of Appeal removed (a) and
reformulated (b) to read:
having unsupervised contact of any kind with any
female under 16 other than (i) such as is inadvertent
and not reasonable avoidable in the course of lawful
daily life or (ii) with consent of the child’s parents or
guardian who has knowledge of his conviction and
the terms of this order. (This prohibition was not to
apply to one named child).
What is a suitable punishment for a man who repeatedly
breaches a SOPO? In Cooper [2015] EWCA Crim 684,
the Court of Appeal had to consider the case of a man
who had repeatedly broken the terms of his SOPO,
which included prohibitions on him having ‘any unsu-
pervised contact of any kind with any male or female
under the age of 16 other than such as is inadvertent and
not reasonably avoidable’ and ‘initiating contact or seek-
ing to communicate with any female who is alone in a
public place other than such as is inadvertent and not
reasonably avoidable’. He had initiated conversations
with a boy and a lone woman in a public place – for
which he received a four-year sentence. The Court of
Appeal reduced this to three years, but clearly agreed
that a significant sentence was required on a man who
was considered to be posing a very high risk of re-
offending and a very high risk of serious harm to mem-
bers of the public. But a three-year sentence for breach
of a ‘civil’ order puts the lie to the distinction between
civil and criminal sanctions.
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 also introduced foreign
travel orders and risk of sexual harm orders.35 These
have been less used than SOPOs and can be glossed
over here because all these were replaced from 8 March
2015 by a new pair of preventative orders: SHPOs and
Sexual Risk Orders. Why were these new orders
required? The changes have arisen largely out of a
review of the previous orders commissioned by the
police (the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)
Child Protection and Abuse Investigation Working
Group), led by Hugh Davies QC, which was published
in May 2013.36 The focus of that review was the sexual
exploitation of children internationally. They resisted
the term ‘serious’, borrowed from existing legislation,
‘since it pre-supposes that there is some category of sex-
ual harm that may be caused to a child that is not
intrinsically serious or that is not worthy of prevention’
(p. 3). But the changes of the Anti-Social Behaviour,
Crime and Policing Act 2014 go further than the ACPO
Review suggested and are not limited to offences against
children.
SHPOs can be imposed on someone convicted or cau-
tioned for a relevant offence and who poses a risk of sex-
ual harm to the public in the UK or children or vulnera-
35. Shute, above n. 32.
36. See H. Davies QC, ‘Civil Prevention Orders Sexual Offences Act 2003’,
available at: <www. ecpat. org. uk/ sites/ default/ files/ the_ davies_ review.
pdf> (last visited 27 May 2016).
ble adults abroad. It may impose any restriction that the
court deems necessary for the purpose of protecting the
public from sexual harm, and makes the offenders sub-
ject to notification requirements for the duration of the
order. The SHPO is available at the time of sentencing
for a relevant offence, or on free-standing application to
the magistrates’ court by the police or National Crime
Agency after the time of the conviction or caution.
A Serious Risk Order can be made by a court in respect
of someone who has done an act of a sexual nature and
who, as a result, poses a risk of harm to the public in
UK or children or vulnerable adults abroad. They do
not need to have been convicted of an offence. A court
may impose any restriction that it deems necessary for
the purposes of protecting the public from harm (this
includes harm from the defendant outside the UK,
where those to be protected are children and vulnerable
adults), and requires the individual to notify the police
of his/her name and address, including where this
information changes. As with the SHPO, a Serious Risk
Order is available on a free-standing application to a
magistrates’ court by the police or the National Crime
Agency.
Finally, we should note that Notification Orders can
now be made by a court, on the application by a chief
officer of police, in relation to someone who has been
convicted, cautioned or had a relevant finding made
against them for specified sexual offences in a country
outside the UK. In effect, this broadly makes those con-
victed abroad subject to the notification requirements of
Part II of the 2003 Act as if they had been convicted of
or cautioned for a relevant offence in the UK.
An emerging issue is the question of costs. In an inter-
esting recent example (Chief Constable of Warwickshire
v. MT [2015] EWHC 2303 (Admin)), the chief consta-
ble of Warwickshire won his appeal against a court order
that he should pay a sex offender £3,189.60 after he had
withdrawn his application for a SOPO. Following the
offender’s release from a thirteen-year sentence, the
chief constable became concerned that the offender was
acting in breach of his licence conditions and applied for
a SOPO. The chief constable withdrew his application
when he learnt that the offender was moving away from
his administrative area. The original court had ordered
the chief constable to pay the offender’s costs associated
with this application but on appeal it was held that
because the chief constable had not acted dishonestly or
unreasonably in bringing the application, the appropri-
ate order was no order as to costs. Doubtless questions
of cost are vitally important in relation to much decision
making in relation to MAPPA/SOPO by the authori-
ties. The costs to the offender may be less obvious.
4 Evaluation
How do we evaluate English law? Clearly, the ‘main-
stream’ sentencing regime is punitive: sex offenders face
lengthy custodial sentences, and release is always sur-
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rounded by complex licence conditions. These licence
conditions may run in parallel with, or be followed by,
other burdensome requirements, imposed under MAP-
PA or the civil orders. A key question is proportionality
– are the measures imposed on offenders (ex-offenders)
too burdensome, too onerous and too intrusive? What is
‘intrusive’ or less ‘intrusive’, of course, depends on the
perception of the person subject to the relevant meas-
ure. And the level of intrusion will depend on the pre-
cise conditions attached – whether this is a licence con-
dition or a civil order.
It is clear that, in theory, in English law civil preventa-
tive orders are not formally part of the ‘sentence’ of a
court imposed as a punishment for a crime. These are
independent measures, civil in nature (even though
breach of one is a criminal offence). There has been lit-
tle discussion as to the ways in which the ‘main’ sen-
tence might be modified because of the availability of
other sanctions. It seems to me that the distinction
between ‘civil’ and ‘criminal’ makes little sense. Of
course, the fact that a measure is labelled as civil lowers
the burden of proof, so it makes it easier for the police to
obtain. But the outcome will undoubtedly feel punitive,
and criminal in nature, to the offender.
There are also other routes to ‘punishment’, certainly to
non-consensual detention and to other restrictions on
liberty, under the Mental Health Acts 1983 (as amen-
ded). People can seek voluntary help with psychiatric
services, and they may also be detained involuntarily for
treatment. But this would be rare in the case of non-
convicted sexual abusers. Psychiatric services are hard-
pressed, and often are reluctant to intervene when their
intervention is not obviously therapeutic. They tend to
be only marginally involved in working with sex offend-
ers, and mental health issues relating to individual sex
offenders are often overlooked.37 It may well be that
there are those who have expressed serious interest in
sex abuse have been detained under the Mental Health
Act, but no data on this are available.
Perhaps the most important and currently unanswered
questions surround the interplay between the different
measures:
1. Should a judge when sentencing consider the availa-
bility of SOPOs when deciding whether to give an
indeterminate, an extended or a determinate sentence
to an offender who stands at the threshold of being
‘dangerous’?
2. Should the licence conditions take into account a pos-
sible SOPO? Should offenders released from prison
face one set of conditions and not two?
3. Who should set the conditions, and who should mon-
itor them? In England at the moment, as we have
seen, as well as MAPPA, the Parole Board and the
prison authorities have a significant role in identify-
ing relevant licence conditions.
37. See e.g. J. Borrill, The Multi-Agency Management of Sex Offenders in
the Community – The Mental Health Foundation (2000).
Judges have been persuaded that it is unhelpful for
them to suggest licence conditions at the point of sen-
tence. These are imposed in the name of the prison gov-
ernor at the time of release. It would be timely to review
the supervision of sex offenders in the community in
order to see whether the system might be better ‘joined
up’. Whether the advantages of judicial involvement in
sentence supervision and implementation, as seen in
other jurisdictions, would transfer to the English con-
text should be explored.38
4.1 A Human Rights Perspective
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
was not incorporated into domestic law until the Human
Rights Act 1998. This statute, recognising the suprema-
cy of Parliament, does not give the judges the power to
strike down legislation, but merely to issue a declaration
where any statutory provision is incompatible with the
European Convention. The Government will usually
then act on the ruling and change the law – but not
always. But the common law continues to flow strongly
in parallel with the European jurisprudence. Lord
Cooke put the point well in the prisoners’ rights case of
R (Daly) v. Home Secretary [2001] 2 AC 532:
The truth is, I think, that some rights are inherent
and fundamental to democratic civilised society.
Conventions, constitutions, bills of rights and the like
respond by recognising rather than creating them….
The point that I am emphasising is that the common
law goes so deep (at para. 30).
A recent example is Abedin v. Secretary of State for Jus-
tice [2015] EWHC 782 (Admin), which involved a chal-
lenge by a prisoner who had been recalled to prison
while on licence. The frustration for Abedin was that,
once recalled to prison when on licence, the law had
been changed and as a recalled offender his fixed release
date became the end of his full term of imprisonment,
rather than at the three-quarter stage. He challenged
this under Articles 5 and 7 of the ECHR. Laws LJ, giv-
ing the judgement of the High Court, carefully reviewed
a host of European and domestic precedents. The Court
held that there was no violation of Articles 5 and 7 of the
ECHR despite the decision of the European Court of
Human Rights in Del Rio Prada v. Spain [2014] 58
EHRR 37. The relevant European and English authori-
ties showed that there had been no erosion in principle
of the well-established distinction between the penalty
imposed, and the means of its enforcement or execution:
Abedin lost on both common law and ECHR principles.
Much of the litigation concerns the period that the
offender serves in prison. It is scandalous that many sex
offenders ‘queue up’ to do the courses required of them
before the Parole Board will direct their release. There
have also been lengthy delays in moving them to open
38. M. Herzog-Evans and N. Padfield, ‘The JAP: Lessons for England and
Wales?’ Criminal Justice Alliance (2015), available at: <http://
criminaljusticealliance. org/ wp -content/ uploads/ 2015/ 04/ cja_ policy -
briefing3_ 200315. pdf> (last visited 27 May 2016).
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conditions, and many delayed Parole Board hearings.
The prison authorities were unprepared for the surge of
IPP cases after 2005, and hundreds of IPP prisoners
have got ‘stuck’ in the system. In Secretary of State for
Justice v. Walker and James [2008] EWCA Civ 30, the
Lord Chief Justice did not mince his words:
This appeal has demonstrated an unhappy state of
affairs. There has been a systemic failure on the part
of the Secretary of State to put in place the resources
necessary to implement the scheme of rehabilitation
necessary to enable the relevant provisions of the
2003 Act to function as intended (para. 70).
The case went to the House of Lords in Wells v. Parole
Board [2009] UKHL 22, and then to the ECtHR in
James, Lee and Wells v. UK [2013] 56 EHRR 12, which
held that there was a breach of Article 5(1).
Recently, in R (Kaiyam) v. Secretary of State for Justice
[2014] UKSC 66, the Supreme Court declined to follow
the decision of ECtHR in James: although it was implic-
it in the scheme of ECHR Article 5 that the state had a
duty to provide a reasonable opportunity for a prisoner
subject to an indeterminate sentence to rehabilitate him-
self and to demonstrate that he no longer presented a
danger to the public, that was an ancillary duty that
could not be brought within the express language of
either Article 5(1)(a) or Article 5(4), and did not there-
fore affect the lawfulness of detention, just the possibili-
ty of damages. On the facts follow:
– The delay for H in being transferred to open condi-
tions had deprived him, contrary to Article 5, of a
reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that he was no
longer a danger to the public, an opportunity that the
Secretary of State himself had said that he should
have. There had been though no breach of Article 14
in discriminating between pre- and post-tariff prison-
ers.
– Similarly, for M, the delay in being able to com-
mence an extended SOTP until nearly three years
after the expiry of his ‘tariff’ period (and after the
Secretary of State had provided for a timetable that
was not fulfilled) had deprived him of the reasonable
opportunity to demonstrate that he was no longer a
danger, in breach of Article 5.
– The delay for K, however, in being able to commence
various rehabilitative treatment programmes did not
breach his Article 5 rights. He had been provided
with a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that he
was no longer a risk to the public through courses on
enhanced thinking, drug awareness and victim aware-
ness, but his responses to those programmes had
been poor.
– In R, Lord Hughes (for the majority) held that the
delay in being able to commence an extended SOTP
until nearly nine months after the expiry of his ‘tariff’
period did not breach his Article 5 rights. The ques-
tion was not whether he had been deprived of access
to a particular course, but whether he had been given
a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that he was
no longer a danger to the public. Lord Mance (dis-
senting) considered that Article 5 required that R be
given a reasonable degree of access to the extended
SOTP, which he had not been given in the circs of
the present case.
What does this case tell us? First, some sorry examples
of the delays inherent in the system. Secondly, it illus-
trates the parallel lives of the common law and the
ECHR. There is at the moment in England a grow-
ing (?) political resentment of the European Union, and
this overflows into a wariness of the European Court of
Human Rights and its ‘liberal Judges’. It seems clear
that as we enter a political period when it is possible that
the Government may talk seriously of withdrawing from
a number of European institutions, the judiciary will
make it increasingly clear that prisoners’ rights are as
protected by a dynamic common law as well as by the
ECHR. Both the common law and the ECHR are living
and evolving. In any case, the ECHR itself provides
merely a low threshold of minimum rights, common law
judges, quite as much as European court judges, can be
expected to develop equal if not stronger protections.
What is clear is that the domestic lower courts always
assess SOPOs against principles of certainty and pro-
portionality. The higher courts spend much legal energy
on applying (and distinguishing) both ECtHR and
domestic jurisprudence.
6 Conclusion
How ‘dangerous’ are sex offenders? The number of
MAPPA eligible offenders charged with Serious Fur-
ther Offences (SFO) in 2013-2014 was 174. This was a
14% rise from 2012/2013 when there were 149 offend-
ers charged with an SFO. But, of the 174 offenders
charged with an SFO in 2013/2014, 143 were being
managed at Level 1, 28 at Level 2, and 3 at Level 3.39
The fact that only three of these were ‘Level 3’ offend-
ers reminds us that predicting rare events remains, as
ever, difficult.40 We have noted the huge numbers of sex
offenders in the community, many of whom are of
course ex-offenders.
There are evident tensions between security and justice,
and between public protection and rehabilitation.
Despite attempts in the past decade to ‘join up’ the pris-
on and community parts of sentences, there continues to
be little continuity in ‘management’. Once sex offenders
39. MAPPA data in this article come from the Ministry of Justice, Multi-
Agency Public Protection Arrangements Annual Report 2013/14
(2014), available at: <www. gov. uk/ government/ uploads/ system/
uploads/ attachment_ data/ file/ 369414/ mappa -annual -report -2013 -14.
pdf> (last visited 27 May 2016).
40. J. Craissati and O. Sindall, ‘Serious Further Offences: An Exploration of
Risk and Typologies’, 56 Probation Journal, 9-27 (2009); N. Padfield,
The Sentencing, Management and Treatment of ‘Dangerous’ Offenders
(2010), available at: <www. coe. int/ t/ dghl/ standardsetting/ cdpc/ PC -GR
-DD/ PC -CP(2010)10 rev 5_ E_ vs 26 01 11_ - THE SENTENCING
MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT OF DANGEROUS OFFENDERS. pdf>.
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are released, the authorities appear to monitor sex
offenders closely, under both licence conditions and
MAPPA, often indefinitely. It is already extraordinarily
difficult for sex offenders to reintegrate, and the pres-
sures of supervision and monitoring can be counterpro-
ductive. As Craissati writes:
…really thoughtful risk management does not always
consist of rights and wrongs, but of dilemmas …
there is a fine line between control and persecution,
one that is difficult to detect at times, and that social
exclusion – in the current climate – seems to be an
unavoidable consequence of rigorous risk manage-
ment…. The possibility that stringent risk manage-
ment approaches embodied within the MAPPA re-
creates – for some offenders – the disturbing experi-
ences of their early lives seems absolutely clear. That
it may paradoxically result in triggering greater levels
of offending is an uncomfortable idea, as is the sug-
gestion that in order to reduce risk, sometimes pro-
fessionals and agencies may need to take risks.41
More intensive monitoring can have negative as well as
positive results. Digard concluded that
disregard for procedural fairness may decrease
offender’s levels of mental well-being, engagement in
their management, motivation to forge new lives, and
respect for authorities and the civic values they repre-
sent. It may inhibit the maintenance of an effective
probation/client relationship and increase resistance.42
Yet the ‘control’ exercised over sex offenders appears to
be getting ever-tighter: for example by the lowering of
the threshold for the new SHPO (as we have seen,
where it used to be that a court had to be satisfied that
an order was necessary to protect the public from ‘seri-
ous’ sexual harm, now it is simply that the court is satis-
fied that the order is necessary to protect from sexual
harm).
Much of what appears to go under MAPPA is ‘charac-
terised by the use of restriction, surveillance, monitor-
ing and control, compulsory treatment and the prioriti-
sation of victim/community rights over those of offend-
ers’.43 It seems unlikely that the ‘fear’ and public fasci-
nation with the sorts of sexual offending outlined in the
Introduction will disappear. Lengthy sentences will
continue to be the norm. It is vital that the courts
remain vigilant, whether it is under the umbrella of the
41. J. Craissati, ‘The Paradoxical Effects of Stringent Risk Management:
Community Failure and Sex Offenders’ in N. Padfield (ed.), Who to
Release? Parole, Fairness and Criminal Justice (2007), at 227; see also
N. Padfield, ‘Discretion and Decision-Making in Public Protection’, in M.
Nash and A. Williams (eds.), The Handbook of Public Protection
(2010).
42. See Ministry of Justice (2015), above n. 20, at 60.
43. H. Kemshall, ‘MAPPA, Parole and the Management of High-Risk
Offenders in the Community’, in N. Padfield (ed.), Who to Release?
Parole, Fairness and Criminal Justice (2007), at 206; see also H. Kem-
shall, ‘Risk, Rights and Justice: Understanding and Responding to Youth
Risk’, 8 Youth Justice 21-37 (2008).
common law or the ECHR, to safeguard the rights of
offenders.
It is extraordinary that the subject has not had more
scrutiny from academic criminologists and lawyers: the
extent of post-custodial and post-sentence supervision
has not caught the attention of academics as it should
have done. Academic criminologists44 and lawyers have
failed to engage policy makers, particularly in under-
scoring the difficulties faced by sex offenders in their
attempts to leave their criminal pasts behind them,
especially in the current climate, and in questioning the
weight and burdens of disproportionate monitoring.
Ironically, it may be the cost of controls and supervision
in the community that effect more changes in the
future.45 Politicians may start to worry about the costs
of MAPPA, ViSOR and the widespread use of civil pro-
tective orders and to question their effectiveness. Then
it may not be a culture of ‘human rights’ that protects
sex offenders from disproportionate restriction and sur-
veillance, but simply a financial calculation.
44. An honourable exception is S. Maruna and T. LeBel, ‘Welcome Home?
Examining the “Re-Entry Court” Concept from a Strengths-Based Per-
spective’, 4 Western Criminology Review 91 (2003).
45. Between 2010-2011 and 2014-2015, the NOMS saved almost £900
million, a reduction of nearly a quarter against its 2010-2011 baseline.
It has a savings target of a further £91 million for 2015-2016: see
National Offender Management Service, ‘Annual Report and Accounts
2014/15’ (2015).
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